The Book of the Watchers (i.e., 1 Enoch 1–36) contains several punishments for the fallen Watchers’ crimes. Interestingly, one of the penalties is optical in nature – God forces the Watchers to observe the eradication of their beloved offspring (10:12; 12:6; 14:6). However, the text itself does not explain why God chose to inflict this form of penalty. The present article seeks to provide a satisfactory explanation in light of the ocular theories contemporaneous with the mentioned literature. This undertaking reveals that the Watchers’ particular offense – voyeurism (6:2) – is critical to understanding their optical sentence because the deities often employed visual penalties to punish improper amorous gazing. In this regard, the Book of the Watchers demonstrates a talionic correspondence between the Watchers’ voyeurism and God’s response to it. Ultimately, the ocular penalty depicts God as the righteous judge who renders fitting retributions to the criminal.
From 2007 and throughout the 2010s the role of the Belarusian diplomatic service has grown in importance following the adoption of a new foreign policy strategy. The new strategy moved away from focusing solely on Russia and involved engaging with alterative actors such as the EU.
While the diversification of Belarusian foreign policy attracted the attention of a number of scholars, little has been written so far about the elites implementing this change. This article analyses the changes in the Belarusian decision-making and implementation process on questions of foreign policy in the 2010s in comparison with the previous decade. The study also compares career trajectories of Belarusian diplomats working on the EU “vector” with another emerging vector called the “far arc”. All these elements, on one hand, reflect the growing diversity of Minsk’s foreign policy, and, on the other, more specifically the oscillations of foreign policy towards the EU.
The house of study of Amoraic Palestine has resisted study because of its informality. By situating it alongside Hellenistic, Roman and Christian education, this article argues that examining their funding provides a means of understanding the structural tendencies of these study circles. Communal support appears mostly aspirational, providing clues as to intention and conflicts regarding inclusion. Similarly, narratives concerning individual gifts urge their moral good rather than their reliability, thus pointing inevitably to fees as the underlying means of support for the beit midrash. The necessity of fees in turn demands consideration of how those of more marginal means, including scribes, could afford this tuition. Finally, that teaching younger children provided one avenue of such support reveals a complex interdependency of those who had easier access to this education and those who had less access, as well as the barely glimpsed suggestion of other educational alternatives.
Anti-establishment parties with either a left-wing or a right-wing ideological slant have been entering contemporary European Democracies with sizeable vote shares. During the Great Recession, the Greek party system could be perceived as a relevant case-study for the formation and breakthrough of anti-establishment parties. Given the fact that two deeply ideologically diverging anti-establishment parties, the Coalition of the Radical Left – Social Unionist Front (syriza) and the populist radical right-wing Independent Greeks (anel), came to power, forming a coalition government from early 2015 to January 2019, the primary goal of this article is to enquire into ‘supply-side’ parameters, exploring potential associations along a range of programmatic stances and policy dimensions that effectuated the syriza-anel alliance. Using the Comparative Manifesto Project and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey datasets from 2012 to 2017, our findings confirm beyond the expected programmatic differences the existence of a converging policymaking basis between syriza and anel which goes beyond the ‘pro-Memorandum vs. anti-Memorandum’ divide.
Studies have identified variables that influence ngo objectives, organizational structures and activities, often related to the broader socio-economic context. Among the most important are the availability of funding and the density of networks. Both factors affect ngo s by driving them either to adjust priorities and widen or limit their operations and/or to become more or less extrovert. This article aims to assess whether, how and to what extent the recent refugee crisis has impacted the Greek ngo ecosystem in terms of scope of activities, professionalization, organizational structures and transnational networking. Available funding, mostly from European institutions, has suddenly and spectacularly increased while International ngo s (ingo s) established operations to Greece – some cooperating with local partners. Likewise, several Greek ngo s (gngo s) embarked on a process of significant operational expansion, mostly ‘in the field’ and as part of an ‘emergency response’. Also, a series of grassroots organizations have been created – mainly at the local level. Based on a series of interviews with executives of the most recognizable gngo s, funders and policymakers and a survey based on questionnaires, the authors argue that the impact was both positive and negative and varied extensively depending on the size and type of organization under focus.
This article analyses and develops the rationale behind the foreign policy of the syriza-led government towards the Western Balkans. It challenges the prevalent view in the academic literature that there was continuity between policies of the syriza government and its predecessors. By analysing the track record of Greek foreign policy towards the region from 2009 to 2019, it argues that from mid-2016 onwards syriza implemented a major policy shift and adopted a policy of retrenchment. This change was a response to the country’s diminished economic and diplomatic power and influence in the region, as well as a reaction to the widening gap between Greek and Turkish capabilities. The adjustment of Greek foreign policy to the realities of the protracted economic crisis demonstrates that the theory of MacDonald and Parent concerning the policies followed by great powers in acute economic decline may also be applied to the study of policies followed by small powers in decline.
The focus of this article is on the main aspects of economic governance in Greece during the period 2015–19 where the syriza-anel coalition party was in power. In August 2015, the syriza-anel government faced the dilemma either to accept a new agreement with the EU partners (as eventually happened) or go bankrupt and leave the Eurozone, becoming detached from EU solidarity mechanisms. A third program was agreed, offering Greece an additional €86 billion loan over a three-year period. The third programme was unnecessary considering that the syriza-anel governance inherited 0.8% growth rate and some progress in the structural reforms demanded during the first two agreements in 2010 and 2011. However, the political choices made had the consequence of Greece returning to recession in 2015 and 2016.
This study examines the transformation of the Greek higher education system at a time of crisis focusing on syriza/anel governance (2015–19). It aims to contribute to the literature on coalition governments’ policy choices. It also intends to enrich the research on the new party cleavages triggered by the economic crisis which hit both Europe and Greece in 2008/9, across pro- vs anti-Europeans/Eurosceptic and pro- vs anti-austerity parties, and on how these cleavages are reflected in higher education policy. It argues that these divides and the politicisation of higher education at the national and European level mobilized partisan entrepreneurs to pursue their strategies and ideological preferences in framing the agenda, to offer solutions based both on an anti-EU and an anti-austerity platform to reverse and reform the previous governments’ laws and forward their own reforms.
The transformation of syriza from a minor party struggling to enter parliament into a major governing party within a short period of time, its rule in the context of an economic crisis, and its resilience following four and a half years of governance make a very interesting story. syriza has been the only radical left populist party that has governed an EU country in recent times. This introductory article accounts for the factors that facilitated syriza’s catapulting to power, while the special issue assesses some of the main issues that the syriza-led government dealt with from 2015 to 2019. With the danger of oversimplifying a more complex picture, the special issue editors argue that syriza emerged as a serious contender to power owing to two factors: i) the errors in the economic policies of the governments that ruled during the 2010–2014 period, and ii) its successful exploitation of the opportunity to capitalize on the dynamics of a grassroots protest movement (the ‘Aganaktismenoi’) through the adoption of the movement’s populist discourses. The introduction then explicates the consolidation of syriza in the Greek political system and concludes with a brief presentation of the structure of the special issue.