The non-scientific questioning of scientific research during the COVID-19 pandemic, the unwillingness of a president of the United States of America to accept the result of a democratically held election: just in recent times, there have been quite a few striking examples of long-held certainties appearing as nothing more than just illusions. This essay reflects on the severe consequences of the loss of such certainties in the spheres of democratic politics on the one hand and of science, especially for highly differentiated societies, on the other hand as well as on their interdependencies. Furthermore, the author tries to make the case that this disillusionment could prove to be a salutary shock – reminding us that we need to take a stand for the things we hold as certainties, oftentimes even as calming ones, if we want them to stay how we always thought they were.
The essay compares August Dorner’s and Wilhelm Herrmann’s usage of the concept of truth. Truth is connected to individuality and collective consciousness. Describing the differences in terms of theological history leads to the question which function the respective usage fulfils and how the perception of theology changes accordingly. Wilhelm Hermann’s theology is thus characterized as an attempt to use the concept of truth to advance a constitutive-reflexive modernization of theology.
This article deals with Bonhoeffer’s ethics as an example for a so-called Christian utilitarianism. Within this framework, which is a consequence of a specific Christian understanding of reality and of a specific view on human existence, we can face ambiguities of life including moral ambivalences of truth and lies depending on different concrete situations. One of the main theological preconditions for doing so is the trust in God’s reconciliation of our God-less world in Christ. This conviction leads us to overtake moral responsibility including risks of becoming guilty in a tension between doubts and truthfulness.
Showing the World. Worldliness and Givenness in Education
The article deals with questions of the sociality and mundanity of education from a fundamental-theoretical and phenomenological perspective. Based on Prange’s theory of showing educating as, an ontology of showing oneself as social other and the world, is developed and illustrated with examples of empirical classroom research. The showing of the world happens in the mode of a »fungierende« intentionality (Fink) that allows something to show itself in a difference and a relation to the world that withdraws educational representation.
Education is defined as a basic concept of pedagogy against the background of the need for education and the ability of people to learn. Education reveals itself as a human practice consisting of two distinct but at the same time related operations. Education as a basic concept of pedagogy enables both the unity of the pedagogical discipline and profession as well as the contoured demarcation from neighboring human sciences and can thus emphasize the special knowledge base of pedagogy.
The article examines how education can be determined in general and universal terms in the face of modernity and postmodernity. In doing so, the theory of operative pedagogy is taken up and linked with motifs of a critical way of thinking. The thesis is that the operative core of education today can only be formulated with the inclusion of a critical examination of power and domination in society. This leads to the development of education as a multi-perspective steering of learning processes.
The article asks how education can be thought in a feminist method. At this point, the relationship between education, feminism, politics and theory is introduced. Starting from Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s demand on mothers to be subjects and from a stated unequally gendered relationship of care, feminist perspectives on education are outlined (Simone de Beauvoir, Jessica Benjamin, Luce Irigaray, Regina Becker-Schmidt). The article’s aim is to discuss the possibilities and limitations of feminist education.