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Abstract
The article focuses on the role of Western goods and cultural influences in the Estonian SSR during late socialism, aiming to analyze “conspicuous” consumption practices, behaviors, and attitudes. Situated in the context of Soviet modernization and the economy of shortages, the article moves beyond the dominant discourse of scarcity and contributes to a growing body of literature that has uncovered the Soviet consumer as a modern shopper with distinctive tastes, demands, and sensibilities that were formed at the interplay between the socialist “good taste” and the imagined, yet incredibly tangible manifestations of Western material objects. The article argues that younger, urban, and largely female consumers in Soviet Estonia were susceptible to the enticement of materiality and status-oriented consumption that could be explained by the rise of “new” Soviet consumer’s consciousness, Western-imitating do-it-yourself practices, and acquisition of Western goods that were regarded as a sign of knowledge, prestige, and social standing.
Abstract
February 24, 2022, after several months of preparation, Russia launched a full-scale war against Ukraine. For the EU and NATO states, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine means, inter alia, a major change for their security. But Russia’s war against Ukraine has been going on since 2014. In reaction, the EU, the US, and other Western states imposed economic sanctions on Russia in 2014.
The subject of research is primarily comprehensive (general) sanctions. Another type of economic sanctions—targeted (smart) sanctions—are relatively new, so there is also relatively little research devoted to them. The main purpose of the article is to investigate the impact of smart (targeted) sanctions on five banks: Sberbank, VTB Bank, Gazprombank, Vnesheconombank (VEB), Rosselkhozbank, and three oil companies: Rosneft, Transneft and Gazpromneft. The study has been conducted on the basis of the analysis of the basic indicators illustrating the financial situation and changes in the prices of shares listed on the Moscow Exchange. The main finding is that the effects of sanctions are relatively weak and limited in time; in 2015–2017, a deterioration in the financial situation of only some of the eight corporations surveyed was noticeable, but later their situation improved significantly and in 2018–2019 it was clearly better than before the sanctions were imposed.
Abstract
Deciding how to relate to the Soviet past is a key question in the politics of memory for the societies and political elites of the post-Soviet countries. Throughout the post-Soviet decades Armenian political and intellectual elites tried to form a complex attitude to the Soviet past, neither rejecting, nor appropriating the Soviet legacy completely, but assimilating it within the paradigm of national history. Within this paradigm Soviet Armenia is viewed as a stage in the development of Armenian nationhood, as “the second republic”, which links the first “attempt” at building a nation-state, “the first republic” of 1918–1920, to the “3rd republic”, i.e. the post-Soviet state of Armenia. This paradigm, in which the Soviet past is neither completely rejected, or accepted, but certain elements of it are integrated into the national history narrative, is optimal for post-Soviet Armenia, given both the peculiarity of Armenia’s historical experience (particularly the role played by Russia/USSR in the context of Armenian-Turkish relations), as well as the current geopolitical setting, in which Armenia and Russia are formal allies. This attitude, which can be described as “mnemonic ambiguity”, allows the assertion of an independent and sovereign Armenian state as legitimate, while at the same time avoiding a confrontation with an ally in the realm of memory politics.
Abstract
The article deals with the evolution of Gorbachev’s thinking on the national question during perestroika, providing additional empirical proof to the existing literature on the subject. It looks at why Gorbachev did not consider the national question a priority initially and how he approached nationalist mobilization and interethnic conflicts throughout his period in office. Prominent scholars agree that Gorbachev was blind in managing the national question. The article argues that, while Gorbachev could not elaborate a compelling nationalities policy, his approach did not fundamentally differ from the one he adopted in other policy spheres. Besides, the article shows how his position on the Baltic states and Ukraine led to growing disagreements with some of his key advisors. Also, it stresses the dilemmas Gorbachev had to cope with when dealing with the national question, which he could have hardly solved with single solutions or a new conception of nationalities policy. The article builds on declassified material, Gorbachev’s speeches, notes of the Politburo meetings, and memoirs of former Soviet politicians.