BOOK REVIEWS

Dariusz Dąbrowski, *Daniel Romanowicz król Rusi (ok. 1201–1264). Biografia polityczna*, Kraków: Avalon, 2013. 538 p. 2 maps. ISBN 978-83-7730-069-5

The new study by the Polish historian Dariusz Dąbrowski about the Halich-Volhynian Prince Danilo Romanovich is divided into two volumes (books).¹ Here, we review the first one, devoted to Danilo's political life. The second volume is still being prepared. In it, the author discusses questions of social, cultural and economic history, providing appendices about the controversies about Danilo's political actions in historiography (pp. 12–13). Both volumes are independent. The first volume is divided into five parts: Introduction (I); Danilo's political biography (II); Epilogue (III); Appendices (IV); Bibliography (V). The enumeration of references is continuous. The index of names provided greatly facilitates the use of the book, because it is easy to get lost among the many names and patronymics of Russian princes. There is no index of places. The first four parts are divided into chapters, in which there are from two to eight unequal parts. Understandably, the part about Danilo's life has the most chapters, eight, in which the story of his life and his political-military activities are provided. They are: 'Roman's Heir (about 1201–1205)' (pp. 21–33), 'Difficult Years 1205–1217' (pp. 33–93), 'In the Shadow of the Father-in-Law' (pp. 93–139), 'The Fight of the Volhynia Ruler for Halich (1228–1240)' (pp. 139–217), 'The Attack of the Batu Khan and its Consequences for the Romanovich' (pp. 217–267), 'At the Peaks in 1245–1258' (pp. 267–406), 'Downfall – The Attacks of Burundai and their Consequences' (pp. 406–428), 'The Final Years' (1260–1264) (pp. 428–449).

The structure chosen by Dąbrowski is flawless: the research material is presented in chronological order, adhering strictly to the scheme of the main source of the history of the work, the Halich-Volhynia Chronicle. In the opinion of the author, the chronological narrative is more suitable for the historical biography genre than a thematic narrative (p. 17). But there could have been more small thematic subdivisions in the chronological narrative, because some of the chapters are very long, 'At the Peaks in 1245–1258' has 138 pages of uninterrupted scholarly text. Adhering to the

¹ Since 1855, the life of Danilo Romanovich and the history of his state have been investigated in 21 monographs and seven publications of the Halich-Volhynia Chronicle, see the bibliography of publications (pp. 477–508).

selected structure of study, the author thoroughly, year by year, making various explanatory and extending digressions when necessary, or discussing citations with other authors, provides a detailed biography of the family, political, military and other activities of Prince Danilo Romanovich. It includes virtually all possible implied and hypothetical topics: after the death of his father Roman, the recovery of his squandered inheritance and the territorial expansion of the Halich-Volhynia principality, various aspects of military and confessional policies, dynastic and kinship policies, and relations with the principalities of Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, Austria, the house of the Yaroslaviches (sons of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich) of the Vladimir principality of Suzdal, the Tatars, the Pope, and the Knights of religious orders in the Baltic countries. A striking thematic unit is the political relations with Lithuania and the Yatvingian policy. One has to mention important details, such as the careful adjustment of dates. The work goes beyond the boundaries of one Halich-Volhynia state, and includes aspects of the political development of many lands of Rus' from the end of the 12th century to the middle of the 13th century. After implementing all the objectives and targets of the author, i.e. after the publication of the second volume of the study, the domestic and foreign policy history of Rus' in the whole period will be revealed.

The author of this review has decided to leave in the background a discussion and evaluation of Dąbrowski's study about the discoveries, new insights, discussion, unexpected conclusions, and so on, about the famous Russian prince. Every reader will find in the book a lot of necessary information, and after analysing it more deeply, will look at versions of historical scenes that are important to him, interpretations of sources, the evaluation of the work of political figures, etc. We will devote our attention in the review to how Dąbrowski presents the role of Lithuania in the history of Halich-Volhynia and in the policies of Danilo. From the 1219 treaty with the princes of the Lithuanian lands, the Lithuanian factor continued to grow, and Danilo ended his life engaged with concerns about Lithuania.

The first contact with the Lithuanian princes in 1219, or rather in the winter of 1219–1220, were very successful for Danilo: immediately, ties of friendship that lasted nearly three decades were established. There is no doubt that the work towards success was done in advance, and the author mentions alongside the efforts of Danilo and Vasilko the personal contribution of the widow Maria (?) Romanova. Coming from a family of Byzantine aristocrats, she could use the Byzantine tradition of flirtation with the pagans, in her relations with the Lithuanians, and get their military-political support (pp. 103–104). This is an interesting observation about the birth of a new policy in relations with the pagan Lithuanians in southwestern Rus', especially with regard to its subtle nuance: the Russians requested assistance from the Lithuanians. At the same time, the ambitious Danilo and Vasilko, having started to fight for power in their homeland,

seeking to restore the state of their father (p. 181), in addition to Lithuanian friends, they only had powerful enemies: patrimonial lands controlled by relatives, the Hungarian King Andrew II, Duke Leszek the White of Cracow. By the way, the Lithuanians, as Danilo's friends, immediately attacked the latter lands in 1220. During a meeting of the parties for the first and only time, Danilo saw Mindaugas, in fact only the fourth person in the group arriving from Lithuania. In general, Dąbrowski reiterates the traditional interpretation of the event in historiography, but the Byzantine insights are original and valuable. Further Lithuanian pages of the study only confirm that the Lithuanians cherished faithfully their friendship with Prince Danilo of Volhynia, and periodically of Halich, and his brother Vasilko. One should not doubt that Grand Duke Mindaugas, who was able to turn the chaotic activities of the plunder by greedy armies into something like the rudiments of a personal foreign policy, had sympathies for the Russians. The peaceful southern border with the Russian lands allowed him to consolidate his power in Lithuania, and to dream about the rule of Russian military and commercial cities in the upper reaches of the Nemunas, and the helpful residents of Volhynia opened wide the door for the Lithuanians to plunder the lands of Poland.

In 1238, Danilo continued to expand his power, and took Halich. Part of the laurels of victory had to be given to Mindaugas, because the Lithuanian was an important figure in the slick game by the Russian. It all started with the fact that in the spring of 1238, Danilo took Drohiczyń from Duke Konrad of Masovia, by driving out the brothers of the Order of Dobrzyń established by Konrad that were already joined to the ranks of the Knights Templar. They had to guard Masovia against heretics and the Prussians. So that his former friend Konrad would be aware of who he had actually encountered, Danilo organised an attack by the Lithuanian troops of Mindaugas and the soldiers of prince Iziaslav of Novgorod. The trap was set. Leaving Danilo alone, Konrad became angry at the Lithuanians, and sent Duke Rostislav Mikhailovich of Halich (pp. 205–206) against them. In the same year 1238, when he sent the campaign into Lithuania, Danilo took over poorly defended Halich with lightning speed. This story by the author and the corrected date of events are important for several reasons. First, Rostislav's campaign in Lithuania is associated with the particular policy of Danilo, and not, as claimed in Lithuanian historiography, in retaliation by the Russians of the southern lands for the raids by Lithuanian troops. Second, the corrected date of the event, 1238, is not associated with the attack by Lithuania on the principality of Smolensk in 1239. Third, prince Yaroslav Vsevolodovich of Vladimir-Suzdal chased out the Lithuanian army in 1239. By these and other actions not mentioned here, he hampered the efforts of the Lithuanians to establish themselves in the Daugava commercial highway, and expanded the influence of his family. Fourth, the author demonstrates that Danilo established good wor-

king relations with Prince Yaroslav of Vladimir-Suzdal, and perhaps even divided Rus' into spheres of influence, the north and the south (p. 213). Although the internal bickering by the princes of Rus' strengthened the friendship enhanced by the marriages of children, the Suzdal prince had already experienced how persistently Lithuania strove towards the trade artery of Daugava and partially of Dnieper, the support of Danilo in this case was handy.

In the 1240s, the romantic relations between Danilo and Mindaugas began to worsen, as the Lithuanian appeared to the Russian to be an equal military political contender. The Tatar invasion into Rus' totally freed the Lithuanians from fear, caution and liabilities towards their neighbours in the south. The Tatars undermined the power of Danilo in the principality, forced him to recognise the suzerainty of the Horde in 1242–1245, and repeatedly marched through Halich and Volhynia (pp. 217–242). The Lithuanian King Mindaugas could not have been unaware of what had happened in the lands of the friend of the Lithuanian troops. Dąbrowski emphasises the resulting hostility of the Lithuanians to the Russians (p. 251). He refers to the facts: from 1241 to 1244, the Lithuanian armies began to attack Volhynia, but he sees the cause to be the military-political decline of Halich-Volhynia that began after the Tatar invasions (p. 242). This is undoubtedly true. However, I would add one observation: the hostility was deepened by Mindaugas occupying Grodno, Novogrudok, Slonim and Volkovysk, strategic cities of Russian trade, crafts, and military activities located in the upper reaches of the Nemunas and its left tributaries, on the Lithuanian, Yatvingian and Russian borders. Danilo always tried to maintain their influence, and the Lithuanians here became his main rivals. At that time, important events take place, which the author of the study interprets in a confusing manner: Mindaugas makes peace with Danilo who marries the daughter of Dausprungas, the already late older brother of Mindaugas. The range of dates for the wedding is wide: 1242–1245 or 1245–1248. More accurate dates would give possibly more reliable answers, but there were only *four* in the protograph of the Halich-Volhynia Chronicle, and the chronology of others is already a historiographical problem, and, incidentally, extremely complicated.

The author of the study believes that Mindaugas was reconciled with Danilo about 1242–1245, i.e. before the Halichian victory at the Battle of Yaroslav in August 1245, after which he finally took control of the principalities of Halich and Volhynia. Mindaugas sent troops to help Danilo, but they arrived late. Hence, the marriage with Dausprungaite could have been made before the battle, but not in 1246–1248, as the author himself felt in his other works. Mindaugas offered Dausprungaite as a bride. However, the renewal of the peace between the Lithuanians and Russians prior to 1245 contradicts the facts in the study of the two attacks by Lithuanian troops against Danilo: in 1242, Lengvenis plundered

Melnik in Volhynia, in January 1246 the Lithuanians threatened the papal envoy John of Pian de Carpine, travelling to the Tatars from the manor of Danilo's brother Vasilko in Volhynia to Kiev (pp. 251–252). Dąbrowski attributes the uncoordinated attacks by the Lithuanians to the troops of the group of uncontrollable Lithuanian nobles fighting for power (p. 252). In his deliberations, the author did not notice that Lengvenis was the nephew of Mindaugas, the well-known fist of the policies of the Lithuanian ruler in the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle. In 1242, the attack by the Lithuanians was not a fight among gangs. It is a sign of the policies of Mindaugas, because he held firmly in his hands the policies with the Romanovich in the south. Among other things, this may explain where the Lithuanians who were so dangerous to John of Pian de Carpine on his way to Kiev came from. I guess that they were the troops sent too late by Mindaugas, diverted helpfully to Danilo in the direction of Kiev to 'compensate for losses'. Such facts of compensation in the relations between the Romanovich and Lithuania are known. Therefore, we can affirm that the marriage of Dausprungaite with Danilo occurred in 1245–1248.

The peace between Mindaugas and Danilo in 1245 and their becoming relatives are important for our understanding of further events. First, by this, the achievements of Mindaugas in Grodno, Novogrudok, Slanim and Volkovysk are entrenched. Second, we are faced with a dilemma. Did Mindaugas, as the senior prince of the family and the guardian of the children of Dausprungaite, consolidating his conquests, sincerely hope for long-term peace with Danilo? Or was Danilo wise and watchful, and sowed discord among the Lithuanian relatives, perhaps because he observed a potential conflict for power between the Lithuanian King Mindaugas and his nephews Tautvilas and Gedvydas Dausprungaičiai? And Mindaugas did not understand the plans of the Halichian, and chose the option of marriage for the niece, because his own daughter was quite small. I would see the dilemma in Danilo's favour, citing his own invitation to the Polish princes in 1249 to attack the pagans, because it is 'time for Christians against pagans, because between them discord [has arisen]'. So the pagans contending with each other provided Danilo with more opportunities for political action than when they were friendly and peaceful. Through the wedding of Dausprungaite, Mindaugas fell into the traps cleverly set by Danilo.

In concluding the discussion of this study, I support the author's repeatedly expressed admiration for the military and political talents of Danilo Romanovich. One can see that from his Byzantine mother and the time he spent living at the court of the Hungarian king, he learned many political ruses, developed his powers of observation, the ability to develop plans and implement them thoroughly, and the ability to manipulate. One could supplement the biography of Danilo with the hypothetical assumption that chess was his favourite leisure game.

In the history of Lithuania in 1249–1254 the wars between Mindaugas and the military-political coalition mobilised by Danilo are an event of exceptional significance. Dąbrowski with justification devotes a great deal of attention to this broadly and deeply researched problem in historiography, because Lithuanian politics dominated Danilo's activities for several years. In this review, we will not discuss the ceaseless wars and political bargains in the five-year period, but will evaluate one or another more prominent story. The author does not directly answer the question why Danilo attacked Mindaugas in 1249. After all, he could have not attacked, because Mindaugas cherished peace, and called on the Romanovich not to help the nephews expelled from Lithuania, although they were the brothers-in-law of Danilo. We read the reason for this in the pages of the study. For Danilo, help for the family was only a pretext. The author notes the strengthening of Mindaugas (p. 304), which perhaps Danilo and Vasilko did not notice. Understandably, the threat of force had to be reduced rapidly. At the same time, one should not forget Danilo's interest in the lands of the upper-left tributaries of the Nemunas. The territorial expansion of government in the politics of Mindaugas, Danilo, the Teutonic Order, and other regional rulers at that time was a routine matter. Having formed a coalition against Mindaugas, the Halichian immediately invaded Novogrudok, Volkovysk and Slonim, and later occupied Grodno. The assembled military alliance of Danilo in 1249 reveals both the strength of Mindaugas and the authority of Danilo in the region and his organisational abilities. He was able to reconcile the interests of the Žemaitijans of Vykintas and their deadly enemies the Livonian Order, to bribe the Yatvingians, who a few months earlier, together with the Poles, he drowned in their own blood, and turned to help the Church of Riga. (In Reference no. 798, Dąbrowski provides an accurate response to why the Polish princes of Masovia did not connect with the Russians: during a Yatvingian raid in 1248, having seen the military power of Danilo, they became concerned about competition through the expansion in the Baltic lands.) Now Mindaugas, like Danilo in 1219, did not have a single friend, only enemies. The Halichian invited Yaroslav of Vladimir-Suzdal to the celebrations of the fixing of the prepared steel collar on Mindaugas. This interesting aspect of the study is widely discussed, and we will certainly discover Lithuanian motifs in it. Danilo resorted to the politics of marriage. After the death of Prince Yaroslav Vsevolodovich in 1246, two of his influential sons, the elder Alexander Nevsky and younger Andrew, ruled northeast Rus'. In the winter of 1250–1251, he married Danilo's daughter. The author of the study refers to the expansion of forces hostile to Mindaugas as the main purpose of the marriage (p. 312). He also adds the potential union with powerful princes of Rus', especially Andrew, against the Tatars. It also sees support for Andrew in his strained relations with the Tatars favouring his brother Alexander. The author states that in fact, the new coalition allies against

Mindaugas did not provide any help (p. 314). Therefore, I think that the considerations of the marriage of Danilovna to Andrew directed against Mindaugas were really not the main ones. But later these links may have helped to make the throne of the Polotsk prince more easily accessible to Danilo's cared-for brother-in-law Tautvilas.

Tautvilas became the Duke of Polotsk after the peace between Mindaugas and Danilo, which the author dates at the junction of 1254–1255 (pp. 376–377). Specific points of the peace are mentioned in more or less traditional historiography. However, it emphasises the Russian victory, as the cities of the upper Nemunas, by the will of Mindaugas, became the territory of Danilo's son Roman, with the Lithuanian king remaining as sovereign of the territory. The author correctly calls the model of co-management a condominium. One may note that the fate of Vaišelga is not disclosed in the story, as is usual in this case in historiography. This is important in the future of Danilo's biography to Vaišelga's political role in the future and the confessional flips after the death of Mindaugas.² Dąbrowski raises another, up to now not strongly stressed, point in the agreement: help from the attacks of the Tatars. This is an accurate observation, because the Tatar issue existed in the relations between Danilo and Mindaugas. The first, and, by the way, last joint campaign by Danilo and the Lithuanians of Mindaugas against the Tatars occurred in the author's view in 1256 (p. 397), rather than as traditionally assumed in 1255. The author's observation on the organisation of the campaign is inaccurate. He assigns the organisation of the campaign to Danilo, although in the Halich-Volhynia Chronicle it is stated, and confirmed in historiography, that King Mindaugas invited the raid and drew the route to Vozviagl, and from there to Kiev, and Danilo joined willingly. The campaign was directed against the Tatars, and among its inspirers one can infer the Pope. The campaign collapsed, according to the explanations in the yearbook created for prince Danilo (the yearbook will be included in the famous Halich-Volhynia Chronicle) due to the Lithuanians: they arrived late at the agreed Vozviagl, found the castle burned down by the Russians, and turned home through Lutsk, where they looted the surrounding area, but were crushed by the forces of the princes Danilo and Vasilko. In the Halich-Volhynia Chronicle, in fact of Danilo, the information about these events is presented in a confusing manner. Kiev has disappeared from the campaign plans, the Lithuanians are accused of being late, although in fact they came to the campaign, Danilo and Vasilko knew nothing about

² In Ukrainian historiography, there are convincingly reasoned opinions that Vaišelga ended up with Danilo as a hostage; see T. Vilkul, 'Haličo Voluinės metraštis apie kunigaikščio Vaišelgos vienuolystę', *Naujasis Židinys-Aidai*, June 2004, no. 6, pp. 264–265; T.L. Vilkul, 'Galicko-Volinskii litopis pro postrizenija litovskogo kniazia Voišelka', *Ukrainskii istoričeskij žurnal*, 2007, Nr. 4, p. 26–37; V.B. Antonovič, *Monografii po istorii Zapadnoi i Jugo-Zapadnoi Rosii*, t. 1 (Kijev, 1885), p. 31.

the crushing of the Lithuanians at Lutsk – the traditional passing on of responsibility, discovered later in another Lithuanian story in the chronicle, the exceptional Lithuanian losses, but Mindaugas did not become angry over them, and did not rush to take revenge against Danilo like after the attack of Burundai. It is easy to see what a complicated source of history the Halich-Volhynia Chronicle is, and therefore its literal reading can lead one astray. Prince Danilo still calls for a literal reading with his intelligent scribes who created the yearbook of his works.

In the case of the Vozviagl events, Danilo is not worthy of the sympathy voiced by the author of the study that he did not receive help from anywhere against the Tatars (p. 398). He received it, but with Mindaugas he played another victorious game of chess. Why did Danilo change his plans? Avoid the Tatars? Maybe new circumstances emerged, because in 1255–1256 the death of Batu Khan, the ruler of the Ulus of Jochi, is dated? Maybe the desire to harm the weakening Mindaugas? However, the author does not see any deep conflict between them after the events of Lutsk (p. 410). Hence, either the events described in the chronicle on the history of Lutsk were actually different, or both rulers found suitable compensation. I would make the hypothetical assumption that, in an unclear way and probably not of his own free will, Vaišelga, who after the treaty of 1254 ended up at the residence of Danilo, was allowed to return to his father.

The penultimate larger Lithuanian stories of Danilo's life are the participation of his military forces at the appointment of Berke Khan as the designated heir to Batu, and the Tatar campaign in Lithuania led by the very experienced military commander Burundai in 1258–1259. The Russians were literally taken as recruits to the Tatar army. Vasilko represented the Romanovich, as Danilo cleverly hid from a visit to Burundai. In an exceptionally cold winter, the Tatars marched across the lands of Lithuania and Nalšia, returned through Grodno and the Yatvingians. It does not seem that this undermined the power of Mindaugas, but interrupted his peaceful and friendly relations with the Russians. Their conflict was exacerbated by the fact that Vaišelga, probably living in a monastery between the Nemunas and Lithuania, took prisoner the vassal of Mindaugas, Danilo's son Roman. As Dąbrowski proves, he died later. Thus, friendship disappeared and strife began. Mindaugas regained the Russian cities of the upper reaches of the Nemunas, and took revenge against Danilo by sending his troops into Volhynia in 1262. In these circumstances, the observation of the author that the attacks by soldiers in 1262 in Volhynia and the foray by Treniota into Masovia in 1262 had to be coordinated military action, seeking to undermine the cooperation between the Russians and Masovians (pp. 421–432) is valuable.

Half a year after the death of Mindaugas, in 1264 when Danilo was still alive, the Romanovich began to deal with a serious Lithuanian ques-

tion: forgetting the role of Vaišelga in the case of the 'disappearance' of Roman, they helped the son of Mindaugas to take control in Lithuania. In this history, the author emphasises the appeal of the Lithuanian for help only to Vasilko and Danilo's son Shvarno, i.e. he does not see any significant role by Danilo in the history of Vaišelga's return to Lithuania (p. 447). Soon afterwards, the great Halichian died.

He died leaving behind an impressive source for the history of his works, the famous chronicle, and giving an impetus to the vast literature of research. Dąbrowski was able to use almost all of it, process it and arrange it smoothly. And he has performed this well. A review of the Lithuanian scenes shows that if one or another fact was not noticed, the motivation for some action was not evaluated, or an inadequate conclusion is made, it is trivia compared with the work done and the results of the research obtained. In the opinion of the reviewer, the only uncritical view of the author is associated with the Yatvingians, but this is dominant in Polish historiography. It is incorrect to call the Yatvingians brothers of the Lithuanians at that time (pp. 369–370), to look for the unity of their birthright, as did, for example, Jan Powierski, because Mindaugas and Traidenis did not feel any sentiment of Baltic unity towards them.³

At the end, I would like to make a comment about Danilo as a monarch. One should note that the state created by Danilo was not stable: he himself divided it into holdings for his sons and brother. This is a total contrast with the monarchy in Lithuania created by Mindaugas, the restored Polish kingdom, or the political activity of Alexander Nevsky begun in the unification of the northeast lands of Rus' (p. 462). True, Dąbrowski affirms that by dividing his holdings in the family, Danilo sought to preserve the unity of the state (p. 459), also admitting here that in fact the unity was fiction, that it was impossible. But then, as if doubting his remark, he summarises: Halich-Volhynia was a viable organism (pp. 460–461). Danilo's behaviour was dictated by the archaic dynastic tradition of the Rurikids, which gave priority to the horizontal succession of heredity and the distribution of patrimonial holdings-rural districts, preventing the path of a unified government of the monarch in politics. According to the apt remarks of the author of the study, for not conciliating with that tradition, the Halichian punished his eldest son Lev: he left him fewer districts. Lev was punished for his desire to flirt with the Tatars, and for his ambition to become the leader in the family, the heir to his father's government (Danilo made this his brother Vasilko and son Shvarno) (pp. 455–456).

The study by Dąbrowski compliments Danilo for his life's work. In fact, Danilo was a brave soldier, an extraordinary military leader, excellent in military and political tactics, and an honest and generous ruler. At

³ A. Dubonis, 'Yatvingians in the Genesis of Lithuanian Anti-Teutonic Orientation', *Lithuanian Historical Studies*, vol. 11, 2006, pp. 17–38.

the same time, he was not a far-sighted politician, not going beyond the dynastic political traditions of the Rurikids. His life's work did not have a future. He himself condemned to extinction the state he had created. Danilo lost his last chess game with the History of Time.

Artūras Dubonis